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ML.B. v. S.L.J AND THE RIGHT OF POOR PEOPLE
TO Go TO COURT
Robert B. McDuff*
There is an old New Yorker cartoon where a man is sitting in a lawyer's office.
The lawyer looks across the desk and says, "How much justice can you afford?"
In American society and American law, we have long told ourselves that our
legal system provides, or at least aspires to provide, equal justice under the law.
Of course, the reality is quite different. Discrimination on the basis of race and
sex has long played a part in the operation of our courts and laws, and while
efforts to overcome that have changed things to some extent, serious vestiges
remain. But beyond that, money has always been a major factor in terms of
access to the courts and the ability of a litigant to obtain a better or worse shot at
winning a case or achieving a desired result. Although there are exceptions to
the rule, a person generally has to have a fair amount of money to obtain good
lawyers, investigators, and expert witnesses, to post bail where bail is not mini-
mal, to pay for depositions and scientific tests, and to pay filing fees to get into
court.
Beginning in the 1950s and going into the 1970s, there was something of an
effort to ameliorate the disadvantages of the poor in the legal system-through
constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court under the Fourteenth Amendment,
through the actions of Congress in establishing a legal services program, through
state and local efforts to fund and improve public defender programs, and
through public interest organizations devoted to helping the poor and the outcast.
But the momentum in that direction has since dissipated. While the legal ser-
vices program remains, its scope and funding have been cut, and it serves fewer
and fewer people. Public defender programs in many places suffer from increas-
ing caseloads and decreasing funds. The number of public interest law organiza-
tions has dropped. The Warren Court became the Burger Court and then the
Renquist Court, and the growing conservative majority through the 1980s issued
few decisions addressing the rights of access to the poor in the court system.
Indeed, not much occurred in that arena after the mid-1980s until the 1996 opin-
ion in M.L.B. v. S.L.J,1 which is the subject of this article.
I am one of the lawyers who represented the petitioner in ML.B. and I argued
her case in the United States Supreme Court. The question before the Court was
whether the Mississippi Supreme Court had acted consistently with the
Fourteenth Amendment in refusing, pursuant to its longstanding practice, to per-
mit an in forma pauperis civil appeal to the petitioner, who wanted to appeal the
trial court's termination of her parental rights but could not afford to pay tran-
script and record preparation fees in excess of two thousand dollars.
Of course, the ability of a poor person to participate in a fair way in the court
system goes far beyond the question of fees such as filing and transcript fees that
* B.A., Millsaps College, 1976; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1980. The author is an attorney in Jackson,
Mississippi. He represented the petitioner in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 11I S. Ct. 555 (1996), which is the focus of this
article.
1. 117S.Ct.555(1996).
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are antecedents to bringing a case or taking an appeal. In most cases, the avail-
ability of counsel to navigate the legal and procedural intricacies of the system,
as well as the availability of investigators, expert witnesses, scientific tests, and
money for litigation expenses such as deposition costs, are key components in
presenting a coherent case to the judge, the jury, and the appellate courts. But
the filing and transcript fee cases are nevertheless of prime importance, both
symbolically and practically. Whether a person has an attorney or not, he or she
cannot present his or her case even on a rudimentary level if the courthouse door
is closed due to inability to pay a filing or appeal fee. By contrast, once a person
is allowed in court, there is something to the notion that judges and juries can at
least consider the case-certainly, this is true in some types of cases--even if an
attorney is unavailable to portray the person's position in the most artful fashion.
Independent of issues regarding counsel and other resources, something very
important about a legal system is revealed by the answer to the question of
whether the courts are at least open to people who cannot afford the entry fees
normally charged to those who can pay them.
M.L.B. is discussed here in the context of this question of constitutional law
and the access of poor people to the courts when confronted by filing and tran-
script fees. The article first reviews Supreme Court decisions during prior years
regarding this access-developments which set the stage for M.L.B. Second, it
discusses M.L.B. itself and the Supreme Court's decision in that case. Third, it
considers the possible impact of M.L.B. and the outlook for the future in this
area. Finally, the article discusses the oral argument before the United States
Supreme Court in M.L.B.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Prior to the 1956 decision in Griffin v. Illinois,' criminal defendants in many
states who could not afford transcript fees were precluded from taking appeals
from felony convictions. In Griffin, the Court noted that a state is not required
by the Constitution to provide an appeal in a criminal case. But where a state
does so, the Court held, it also must provide indigent persons a transcript, or its
equivalent, at state expense so they can take advantage of the appeal option irre-
spective of their financial poverty. This result, said the plurality opinion in
Griffin, is compelled by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment? As stated by the plurality opinion, "[t]here is no mean-
ingful distinction between a rule which would deny the poor the right to defend
themselves in a trial court and one which effectively denies the poor the adequate
appellate review accorded to all who have money enough to pay the costs in
advance."4 The four-justice plurality in Griffin was joined in the result by Justice
Frankfurter, who said in his concurrence:
2. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
3. Id. at 18-20.
4. Id. at 18.
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[W]hen a State deems it wise and just that convictions be susceptible to review
by an appellate court, it cannot by force of its exactions draw a line which pre-
cludes convicted indigent persons.., from securing such a review ....
If [a State] has a general policy of allowing criminal appeals, it cannot make
lack of means an effective bar to the exercise of this opportunity.'
In cases after Griffin, a majority of the Court has reaffirmed Griffin and held
that its reasoning is predicated both on the Due Process and the Equal Protection
Clauses.' In several cases decided in the wake of Griffin, the Court invalidated a
number of state practices and statutes that denied indigent criminal defendants
access to effective appeals because of their inability to pay for transcripts.
Among these was Mayer v. Chicago,7 which held that an indigent had the right to
provision of a transcript for appeal in a case where he was faced not with impris-
onment, but merely with a $500 total fine for two misdemeanor offenses.
Griffin and the cases following immediately in its wake were criminal cases.
In terms of civil matters, citizens who want to bring cases as plaintiffs face filing
fees in the trial court, and those who lose in the trial court and want to take
appeals face both filing fees and transcript fees. In some states, the courthouse
doors are closed to those who cannot afford the fees. The Supreme Court first
confronted a civil filing fee with the 1971 decision in Boddie v. Connecticut.
8
There, the Court held that a $60 Connecticut filing fee was unconstitutional
where it precluded an impoverished couple from obtaining a divorce. As Justice
Harlan's opinion for the Court in Boddie explained: "In Griffin it was the
requirement of a transcript beyond the means of the indigent that blocked access
to the judicial process."9 Connecticut's $60 divorce filing fee does the same
thing, said the Court in Boddie, adding that "the rationale of Griffin covers this
case."1 While Griffin was predicated both upon the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses, Boddie specifically relied upon the Due Process Clause. In
doing so, the majority hinged its opinion upon the importance of marriage and
the fact that resort to the civil courts was the only means by which people could
lawfully dissolve a marriage:
[G]iven the basic position of the marriage relationship in this society's hierarchy
of values and the concomitant state monopolization of the means for legally dis-
solving this relationship, due process does prohibit a state from denying, solely
because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial
dissolution of their marriages.11
5. Id. at 23-24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
6. See, Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 193 (1971); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 403-405 (1985).
7. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
8. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
9. Id. at 382.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 374.
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Approximately two months after the decision in Boddie, Justices Black and
Douglas dissented from the denial of certiorari in a number of cases, with the
dissents issued under the case name of Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co."
These cases involved a variety of barriers faced by poor people in the civil justice
system. Justice Black stated:
I dissented in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 389 (1971), but now believe
that if the decision in that case is to continue to be the law, it cannot and should
not be restricted to persons seeking a divorce. It is bound to be expanded to all
civil cases. Persons seeking a divorce are no different from other members of
society who must resort to the judicial process for resolution of their disputes.13
He added:
In my view, the decision in Boddie v. Connecticut can safely rest on only one
crucial foundation-that the civil courts of the United States and each of the
States belong to the people of this country and that no person can be denied
access to those courts, either for a trial or an appeal, because he cannot pay a
fee, finance a bond, risk a penalty, or afford to hire an attorney. 4
In his dissent, Justice Douglas said:
Today's decisions underscore the difficulties with the Boddie approach. In
Boddie, the majority found marriage and its dissolution to be so fundamental as
to require allowing indigents access to divorce courts without costs. When indi-
gency is involved, I do not think there is a hierarchy of interests. Marriage and
its dissolution are of course fundamental. But the parent-child relationship is
also of sufficient importance to require appointment of counsel when the State
initiates and maintains proceedings to destroy it. Similarly, obtaining a fresh
start in life through bankruptcy proceedings or securing adequate housing and
the other procedures in these cases seemingly come within the Equal Protection
Clause, as suggested by my separate opinion in Boddie. 5
One year after Boddie, the Court's decision in Lindsey v. Normet,8 suggested
that the relevant principles from Griffin might encompass not only civil cases at
the trial level, but also those on appeal. Lindsey struck down, as violative of the
Equal Protection Clause, an Oregon statutory provision requiring a double appeal
bond for tenants who appeal eviction cases.'" Although Lindsey did not involve a
transcript fee, the Court's decision in Lindsey cited Griffin in support of the prin-
ciple that "[w]hen an appeal is afforded ... it cannot be granted to some litigants
and capriciously or arbitrarily denied to others without violating the Equal
Protection Clause." 18 While the Court declared the Oregon statute unconstitu-
12. 402 U.S. 954 (1971).
13. Id. at 954 n. 1. (Black, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
14. Id. at 955-956.
15. Id. at 961 (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
16. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
17. Id. at 79.
18. Id. at 77, (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
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tional because of its imposition of special burdens on tenants in eviction cases
that were imposed on no other civil litigants, the Court also mentioned the
impact of the statute on poor people: "[T]he discrimination against the poor, who
can pay their rent pending an appeal but cannot post the double bond, is particu-
larly obvious. For them, as a practical matter, appeal is foreclosed, no matter
how meritorious their case may be." 9
In cases after Lindsey, the Supreme Court did not adopt the more expansive
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment suggested by Justices Black and
Douglas in their Meltzer dissents.2" Instead, the Court's 1973 decisions in United
States v. Kras,21 and Ortwein v. Schwab,22 upheld civil filing fees where no funda-
mental rights were involved. Kras dealt with a $50 filing fee for a bankruptcy
case, which could be paid in installments of as little as $1.28 per week,23 and
Ortwein involved a $25 filing fee for judicial review of an administrative reduc-
tion in old-age assistance.24 In both cases, the Court specifically relied upon its
conclusion that the interests involved were not of the same constitutional magni-
tude as the marriage interest implicated in Boddie.2"
After Ortwein, the Supreme Court took no other filing or appeal fee cases until
M.L.B., although there were intervening cases dealing with the availability of
counsel, expert witnesses, and scientific tests, and with the payment of fines
imposed by the judicial system.2" Of particular importance-given the hierarchy
of interests set up by Boddie, Kras, and Ortwein-was the Court's decision in
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services.7 There, the Court said that a parent
has a "commanding" interest in resisting a forced termination of parental rights.28
At the same time, the Court concluded that due process does not require appoint-
ed counsel for indigent parents in every case where the State seeks to terminate
parental rights, but it will require counsel in at least some of these cases, particu-
larly the complicated ones.29
Thus, when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in M.L.B., it did so against a
background in which Griffin and its progeny had held that the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses are violated where access is precluded to state court
criminal appeals, even in misdemeanors with no prison terms, because an indi-
gent person cannot afford a transcript." Boddie applied that rationale under the
Due Process Clause to filing fees in civil cases involving fundamental rights at
the trial level, 1 and Lindsey suggested that a similar rationale applies as part of
19. Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 79.
20. See Meltzer, 402 U.S. at 954.
21. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
22. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
23. Kras, 409 U.S. at 449.
24. Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 658.
25. Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 659; Kras, 409 U.S. at 445.
26. See, e.g. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983); Evitts v. Lucey,
469 U.S. 387 (1985); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
27. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
28. Id. at 18.
29. Id. at 25-27.
30. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 13-26 (1956).
31. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. at 371.
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the Equal Protection Clause in civil appeals. 2 While Kras and Ortwein conclud-
ed that the rationale does not control with respect to small filing fees in cases
where no fundamental rights are involved,33 Lassiter held that the termination of
a parent's relationship with his or her child clearly implicates fundamental
rights. 4
II. THE ML.B. CASE AND THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
After having been married for nearly eight years, M.L.B. and her then-hus-
band, S.L.J., were divorced in 1992, with their two children remaining in the cus-
tody of S.L.J., their father. Less than three months later, S.L.J. remarried. Just
over one year later, S.L.J. and his new wife filed a case in the Chancery Court of
Benton County, Mississippi, seeking to terminate the parental rights of M.L.B.,
the natural mother of the children, and to have the new wife take her place by
adopting the children. The complaint did not allege any sort of abuse by M.L.B.
toward the children or any type of criminal conduct on her part, but instead it
contended that she had not maintained reasonable visitation and was in arrears
on child support payments.
Under Mississippi law, a person's parental rights cannot be terminated absent
clear and convincing evidence that the parent either abandoned or abused the
child or is so unfit as to warrant termination. Despite this high burden of proof,
the Chancery Judge, after a contested trial spanning three trial days, issued an
order in December of 1994, terminating the parental rights of M.L.B. and in her
stead allowing the new wife to adopt the children. In the order, the Chancellor
cited no specific grounds for the termination and, despite a vigorously contested
trial, cited no specific evidence relating to or supporting his decision. Instead, he
simply issued a conclusory statement repeating word for word the language of
the Mississippi termination statute.36 At the time of the termination, M.L.B.'s
children were nine and seven years old.
In Mississippi, an appeal of right can be taken from all lower court final judg-
ments in parental termination cases, as well as in other civil cases. 7 M.L.B. filed
her appeal and paid the $100 filing fee, but she then was informed that prepara-
tion of the transcript and the record, which were prerequisites for the appeal,3
would cost another $2,352.36. Because she could not afford to pay that amount,
her appeal was dismissed by the Mississippi Supreme Court, which was acting
consistent with its long-standing precedent holding that the right to proceed in
forma pauperis in Mississippi does not exist in civil appeals. 9
32. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
33. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 443-50 (1973); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 658 (1973).
34. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
35. Miss. CODE ANN., §§ 93-15-103,--15-109 (1994 & 1997 Supp.).
36. Miss. CODE ANN., § 93-15-103(3)(e).
37. MISS. CODE ANN., § 11-51-3 (1972).
38. Miss. R. App. Proc. 10(b)(2) & I l(b)(1).
39. See Moreno v. State, 637 So. 2d 200 (Miss. 1994); Nelson v. Bank of Mississippi, 498 So. 2d 365 (Miss.
1986); Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Walters, 200 So. 732 (Miss. 1941).
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In a six to three decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed. According
to the Court, a person cannot be precluded because of indigency from an appeal
that is available to all others from the termination of parental rights.4 0 Both the
majority opinion of Justice Ginsburg, speaking for herself and four others,"' and
the concurrence of Justice Kennedy, relied upon the importance of the constitu-
tional interest at stake when parental rights are threatened with termination. 2
Justice Ginsburg first canvassed the filing fee precedents, beginning with
Griffin and its criminal-case progeny, focusing particularly on Mayer v.
Chicago."3 Justice Ginsburg noted that the right of access by the poor, irrespec-
tive of transcript costs, to appeals open to others has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court to be broader than the right to counsel at state expense." The
opinion also reviewed the civil cases, particularly Boddie." As the Court stated:
"We have also recognized a narrow category of civil cases in which the State
must provide access to its judicial processes without regard to a party's ability to
pay court fees."4 After also discussing Kras and Ortwein, the Court added:
[A]s Ortwein underscored, this Court has not extended Griffin to the broad array
of civil cases. But tellingly, the Court has consistently set apart from the mine
run of cases those involving state controls or intrusions on family relationships.
In that domain, to guard against undue official intrusion, the Court has exam-
ined closely and contextually the importance of the governmental interest
advanced in defense of the intrusion."
The Court then reviewed the precedents requiring special solicitude when fam-
ily matters are involved, with specific emphasis on Lassiter and Santosky v.
Kramer," the latter of which held that a "clear and convincing" standard of proof
is required by the Fourteenth Amendment before parental rights are terminated in
a proceeding initiated by the State."9 The M.L.B. Court pointed to language from
both Lassiter and Santosky saying that a parent facing a termination proceeding
possesses a "commanding" constitutional interest which is, in the words of
Santosky, "far more precious than any property right." 0 As explained in
Santosky and reiterated in M.L.B., a termination decree is "final and irrevocable.""
Having outlined these precedents, the Court then applied them to the case at
hand, noting that the Griffin line of cases relied both on the Equal Protection and
40. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 570 (1996).
41. She was joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer.
42. ML.B., 117 S. Ct. at 570.
43. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
44. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 562.
45. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
46. ML.B., 117 S. Ct. at 562.
47. Id. at 564.
48. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
49. Id. at 769.
50. ML.B., 117 S. Ct. at 565 (quoting Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981), and
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758-759).
51. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 565 (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 (emphasis in original)).
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Due Process clauses." "We place this case within the framework established by
our past decisions in this area," 3 said the M.L.B. opinion, adding that "[i]n line
with those decisions, we inspect the character and intensity of the individual
interest at stake, on the one hand, and the State's justification for its exaction, on
the other." 4 The Court then compared the interests at stake in a parental termina-
tion case with those at issue in Mayer, where the Court held a transcript is
required for an impecunious defendant fined $500 and given no jail time for mis-
demeanor offenses.5 Certainly, said the M.L.B. Court, the interest of a parent
facing termination is at least similar in gravity to that of the misdemeanor defen-
dant in Mayer." The Court added that "[t]he risk of error ... is considerable" in
the termination cases, pointing out that of the eight reported appellate challenges
to Mississippi trial court termination orders from 1980 through May of 1996,
three were reversed for failing to meet the standard of proof." As for the State's
countervailing interest in offsetting the costs of the state court system, the Court
said that interest was not sufficient to justify exclusion of the poor in Mayer and
similarly is not sufficient to justify denial of an appeal in the parental termina-
tion context.5 8
The Court added this:
[W]e do not question the general rule, stated in Ortwein, that fee requirements
ordinarily are examined only for rationality [citation omitted]. The State's need
for revenue to offset costs, in the mine run of cases, satisfies the rationality
requirement [citation omitted]; States are not forced by the Constitution to
adjust all tolls to account for "disparity in material circumstances." Griffin, 351
U.S., at 23 (Frankfirter, J., concurring in judgment).
But our cases solidly establish two exceptions to that general rule. The basic
right to participate in political processes as voters and candidates cannot be lim-
ited to those who can pay for a license [footnote omitted]. Nor may access to
judicial processes in cases criminal or "quasi criminal in nature," Mayer, 404
U.S., at 196 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), turn on ability to
pay. In accord with the substance and sense of our decisions in Lassiter and
Santosky, [citation omitted], we place decrees forever terminating parental
rights in the category of cases in which the State may not "bolt the door to equal
justice," Griffin, 351 U.S., at 24 ... (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)[.] 9
The opinion's concluding section distinguished several prior Supreme Court
decisions in which the Court rejected claims of-as the M.L.B. Court put it-
"[c]omplainants [who] . . . sought state aid to subsidize their privately initiated
52. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 566.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196 (1971).
56. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 566.
57. Id. at 560 n.3, 566.
58. Id. at 566.
59. Id. at 567-568.
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action or to alleviate the consequences of differences in economic circumstances
that existed apart from state action."' By contrast, the Court said:
M.L.B.'s complaint is of a different order. She is endeavoring to defend against
the State's destruction of her family bonds, and to resist the brand associated
with a parental unfitness adjudication. Like a defendant resisting criminal con-
viction, she seeks to be spared from the State's devastatingly adverse action.
That is the very reason we have paired her case with Mayer, not with Ortwein or
Kras [citation ommitted].61
Finally, the Court, in responding to the "floodgates" argument of the dissenters
and the respondent, emphasized that its decision was limited to civil cases with
the magnitude of interests involved in a parental termination case.
Respondents and the dissenters urge that we will open floodgates if we do not
rigidly restrict Griffin to cases typed "criminal." [citations omitted]. But we
have repeatedly noticed what sets parental status termination decrees apart from
mine run civil actions, even from other domestic relations matters such as
divorce, paternity, and child custody. [citation omitted]. To recapitulate, termi-
nation decrees "wor[k] a unique kind of deprivation." Lassiter, 452 U.S., at 27....
In contrast to matters modifiable at the parties' will or based on changed cir-
cumstances, termination adjudications involve the awesome authority of the
State "to destroy permanently all legal recognition of the parental relationship."
Rivera [v. Minnich], 483 U.S. [574,] at 580 [(1987)] [citation omitted]. Our
Lassiter and Santosky decisions, recognizing that parental termination decrees
are among the most severe forms of state action, Santosky, 455 U.S., at 759,
[citation omitted], have not served as precedent in other areas.... We are there-
fore satisfied that the label "civil" should not entice us to leave undisturbed the
Mississippi courts' disposition of this case. 2
Justice Kennedy concurred, stating that while the Griffin line of cases relied
upon both equal protection and due process principles, he believed due process
by itself was a sufficient basis for the Court's holding in M.L.B. '
I acknowledge the authorities do not hold that an appeal is required, even in a
criminal case; but given the existing appellate structure in Mississippi, the reali-
ties of the litigation process, and the fundamental interests at stake in this partic-
ular proceeding, the State may not erect a bar in the form of transcript and filing
costs beyond this petitioner's means.64
Justice Thomas dissented, joined by Justice Scalia in full and Chief Justice
Rehnquist in part. Because of the Court's prior statements that due process does
not require states to provide appeals in the first place, said Justice Thomas, cer-
tainly states are not precluded by due process from charging a fee for the ap-
60. Id. at 568.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 569-570.
63. Id. at 570 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
64. Id.
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peals, even if some people cannot afford it."5 As for the equal protection argu-
ment, Justice Thomas said the Grffin line of cases should not be extended from
criminal to civil matters.66 He also reiterated his belief that the equal protection
theory underlying Griffin no longer remains viable 7 and, in a portion of the opin-
ion that the Chief Justice did not join, said that Griffin should be overruled.'
III. THE POSSIBLE IMPACT OF M.L.B. AND THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE
By its own terms, the M.L.B. holding is limited to parental termination cases.
The majority of the present Court is likely to address questions of access to
courts for poor people on an issue-by-issue basis, looking-as in M.L.B.-to the
importance of the underlying right being litigated rather than holding across the
board that financial barriers which preclude access are unconstitutional.
Parental termination cases involve interests probably more important than in
any other type of civil case, with the possible exception of involuntary civil com-
mitment for mental illness. 9 With respect to other types of civil cases where the
interests are of a lesser magnitude, it is unclear whether M.L.B. will lay the
groundwork for future decisions requiring, as a federal constitutional matter,
appeals for those who otherwise would be shut out because they cannot afford
transcripts. But even though M.L.B. is limited by its terms to the arena of
parental termination, it did breach the civil-criminal barrier that previously had
existed in the transcript cases. In that sense, it provides a starting point for those
impoverished litigants who are kept out of the appellate courthouse in other types
of civil cases because of high transcript and appeal fees.
Indeed, it seems that an argument could be made, both under the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses, that where a state believes appeals are suffi-
ciently important to provide for them as a matter of right in all civil cases-or to
provide for them in certain types of civil cases--citizens should not be prohibit-
ed from taking the appeals simply because they cannot pay hundreds or thou-
sands of dollars in transcript fees.
Of course, the five to four decision in Ortwein could be said to counter that
argument since it held that the Constitution permits a $25 appeal fee as a condi-
tion for obtaining judicial review of an administrative reduction in old-age and
welfare benefits.7" But a $25 fee is not quite as high a barrier as one imposed by
hundreds or thousands of dollars in transcript fees. Moreover, in Ortwein, as the
Court there noted, no argument was made that the $25 fee was disproportionate."
65. Id. at 571 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 576-578.
67. Id. at 572.
68. Id. at 575; M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 570 (Rehnquist, C1, dissenting).
69. In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), the Supreme Court held that the interests implicated by
involuntary civil commitment are sufficiently important to require a "clear and convincing" standard of evi-
dence-a ruling later mirrored in the parental termination context by Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
See In Re L.G., 603 A.2d 381 (Vt. 1992) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that indigent liti-
gants be provided a transcript without cost so they can appeal an involuntary civil commitment); See also
Shuman v. State, 358 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1978) (holding the same).
70. Ortwein v. Scwab, 410 U.S. 656, 656-61 (1973).
71. Ortwein, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973).
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By contrast, transcript fees in most states are set by statute or rule at two dollars
per page or higher and are paid to court reporters who are state employees
receiving significant income from their salaries and the many transcripts for
which they are already paid. These sorts of fees not only are unnecessary in pau-
per cases, but they are disproportionate and irrational, and when they fence poor
people out of appeals available to others, it is hard to justify them. States could
easily do as Texas and West Virginia have done, paying salaries to court reporters
and also paying them for indigent transcripts in criminal cases, but requiring
them-as state employees and officers of the court-to provide transcripts with-
out additional pay for indigents in civil cases.72
The more important arena, at least for the short run, may be not in the interpre-
tation of the federal constitution, but in the interpretation of state constitutions in
those states yet to address certain questions of access to courts. While a number
of states already permit in forma pauperis civil appeals and provide free tran-
scripts to the indigent in all types of civil cases,73 others have not addressed the
issue or permit them only in certain types of civil cases."' The holding of M.L.B.
as a matter of federal constitutional law does not control the outcome under a
state constitution, but state courts may be moved by M.L.B. to address broader
questions of the right of access for impoverished litigants under state law.
IV THE ORAL ARGUMENT
Along with my co-counsel and various lawyers who provided advice about the
upcoming oral argument, I had decided early in my preparation to pitch the mer-
its part of our case in a narrow fashion. We knew, first, that the only issue before
the Court involved the right of access to an appeal of a poor person whose
parental rights were terminated, and there was no call for the Court to decide or
pronounce a broader principle that would extend to other civil cases. Second, we
knew that the majority of the current Court is fairly conservative and no combi-
nation of five justices was likely to buy an argument set out in terms of broader
rights of access for the poor.7"
Near the beginning of the argument, Chief Justice Rehnquist asked if the State
would have to pay the court reporters for the transcripts in these sorts of cases
should we prevail. I responded that the legislature could-if it wished-change
state law so that the court reporters were not paid two dollars per page in these
cases. I referenced Texas and West Virginia, which, as we had pointed out in our
reply brief, allow for payments of two dollars per page to court reporters in all
cases except in forma pauperis civil cases. In those cases, court reporters are to
72. TEx. R. Amp. P. 530); W. VA. CODE §§ 51-7-7, 59-2-1(a)(3).
73. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 567 n. 13.
74. Id.
75. Even the current Justices who might be described as relatively liberal would seem not to be as inclined
as some before them, such as Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, to speak in broad terms of the rights of
access of the poor. See, Jeffrey Rosen, The New Look of Liberalism on the Court, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE,
Oct. 5, 1997, at 62 (describing Justice Ginsburg as having "an affinity for resolving cases on narrow procedural
grounds rather than appealing to broad principles of social justice; a preference for small steps over sweeping
gestures; and an aversion to bold assertions ofjudicial power.").
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prepare transcripts without charge as part of the yearly salary they receive from
the state.7"
Justice Scalia then pointed out that the state could, consistent with the
Constitution, abolish appeals entirely, and if it could do that, he asked, why could
it not restrict appeals to those who could pay for the transcript." I replied:
"[F]or the same reason expressed in the majority opinions in Griffin and the long
line of cases that have followed Griffin."78 The Chief Justice pointed out that
those were criminal cases, and I responded that the Court had expressed the same
principle in, for example, Lindsey v. Normet, which was a civil case.79
The questioning then turned to what I expected would be a key point-whether
a principled line could be drawn between .parental termination cases and other
civil cases. I was asked: "How about a custody proceeding, a child custody pro-
ceeding? Would you be here making the same argument if she had lost in a cus-
tody battle?"8 I responded by saying the argument would not have the same
weight in a custody case because the consequences are not as tragic or final as in
a case involving parental termination. In most custody cases, a parent has a right
of visitation. Even if no visitation is allowed, there is usually an ability to com-
municate, to play a role in the child's life, and in the future, if conditions change,
the aggrieved parent can petition for visitation or even a change in custody.8'
A key question was then asked by Justice O'Connor: "So you think a princi-
pled line can be drawn between this case and a custody case?"82 Yes, I respond-
ed, pointing out that the Supreme Court had held in Santosky v. Kramer that
because of the finality involved, a clear and convincing evidentiary standard
must be met under the Fourteenth Amendment before terminating a parent's
rights, but no court or state had since required a similar standard before a state
takes custody of children from parents without terminating their rights.'
As is often the case in appellate arguments, a series of questions followed test-
ing our position. How about foreclosure of a home-can you distinguish that
from parental termination? What about being dismissed from employment
because of alleged sexual abuse of a child? What about paying millions of dol-
lars in damages in a civil suit for that abuse? What about paternity cases? For
the most part, in responding I fell back on the Supreme Court's own precedents
holding that parental termination cases involved "compelling" and "fundamen-
tal" rights, while-for example-housing did not involve rights of that constitu-
tional magnitude. I continued to emphasize the Court's decision in Santosky v.
Kramer, which had not been extended to other types of cases.8 '
The next question asked whether a ruling in our favor would require the state
to pay for attorneys in these cases: "Why not counsel? Why shouldn't she be
76. Trans. of oral arg. at 4-5, M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555(1996)(No. 95-853).
77. Id. at 5.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 5-6.
80. Id. at 7.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 7-8.
83. Id. at 8.
84. Id. at 9-14.
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entitled, if this is that significant, to have counsel on the appeal?""5 I responded
by citing the majority opinion in Ross v. Mofflitt,86 and paraphrased it as follows:
"[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not give a person the right to duplicate the
legal arsenal of a wealthier person in presenting the case, but it does-the
Fourteenth Amendment does-give a right to present the case in the first place
where the interest is important and where the State has set up these mechanisms
for promoting accuracy and for correcting injustices."87 Later in the argument,
the question of the right to counsel arose again, and I noted that the right to a
transcript and the right to counsel were not coextensive under the Court's deci-
sions, pointing to Mayer v. Chicago, where the Court held that a transcript was
required so a poor person could appeal a misdemeanor conviction with no jail
time, while in Scott v. Illinois' the Court held that state-paid counsel was not
required in such a case.89
The questioning returned to custody cases, and I was asked the practical differ-
ence between this case and one in which there was an order depriving a parent of
custody and visitation. The main difference, I said, was that a parent denied cus-
tody and visitation could later petition to regain those things if conditions
change, while a termination order is final and irrevocable. To illustrate the point,
I noted that the Chancery Court's order in this case required that the name of
M.L.B., the natural mother, be taken off the birth certificate and replaced by the
name of the new mother.9"
Justice Scalia continued questioning about how the line is drawn between
parental termination cases and those of a purported lesser magnitude. I answered
that the Court should go through the same process it utilized in its prior cases,
such as the cases imposing the "clear and convincing" evidentiary requirement.
"I wasn't here then, so I don't know what they did," he responded with a note of
sarcasm. "I thought maybe you could help me out as to how we came to those
conclusions." When I began to respond, "I think it's the traditional sort of
Fourteenth Amendment analysis where you-," he interrupted me and said,
"How I feel about it, essentially." Justice Stevens, waiting to ask a question,
turned to Justice Scalia and said, "Read the opinions."'"
Justice Kennedy earlier had asked a question about our equal protection con-
tentions, and I circled back near the end of my argument to emphasize our posi-
tion that, given the fundamental nature of the interests at issue here, intermediate
scrutiny rather than minimal scrutiny was required in examining the State's justi-
fications for these fees. When I stated that there was not a persuasive justifica-
tion for the two dollar per page transcript and record charge, the Chief Justice
asked if courts would be able to employ court reporters without allowing them to
make this money. I responded that I thought they could, even if court reporters
85. Id. at 14-15.
86. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
87. Trans. of oral arg. at 15.
88. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
89. Id. at 373-374.
90. Trans. of oral arg. at 19-21.
91. Id. at 22-23.
1998]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
earn no money for the in forma pauperis transcripts, particularly since they earn
a yearly salary and are additionally paid by the page for the many transcripts they
prepare for litigants who can afford them.92
With that I reserved the remainder of my time for rebuttal, and my opponent
began. After some initial questions about Mississippi procedure, he was asked
by Justice O'Connor if he conceded that "a fundamental right is at issue here."93
He responded by saying "that the parent-child relationship in the past has been
held by this Court to be a fundamental interest," but that since the parent's rights
had been terminated by the trial court, "we question whether or not there is a
fundamental right at this point in the proceedings."9 Justice O'Connor then
said: "Well, I don't know why the interest wouldn't remain the same throughout
the proceeding. It's either fundamental or it isn't, and maybe some heightened
scrutiny is required of procedures that the State invokes."95
Justice Ginsburg followed with a number of questions regarding the fundamen-
tal nature of the interest at issue.99 When my opponent contended that we "seem
to be making a purely wealth disparity argument, which would potentially bring
in all cases of a civil nature,"97 Justice Ginsburg disagreed, correctly noting that
we had presented our argument in a narrow fashion with a focus on the extreme
nature of parental termination cases.99 When my opponent argued that a ruling in
our favor would also logically encompass paternity cases, he was met with ques-
tioning on that issue by Justices Ginsburg and Stevens.99 Much of the remainder
of his argument was taken up by questions about when a transcript would and
would not be required under Mississippi appellate practice.'
I had saved four minutes for rebuttal. I started by clarifying a statistical point
made during my opponent's argument, and the rest of my time was taken up in an
exchange with Justice Scalia, the Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy, and Justice
Ginsburg about the difference between a divorce case and a termination case.'
V CONCLUSION
We will long be dealing with what the Supreme Court in Griffin~called the
"age-old problem" of"[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, weak and pow-
erful alike."'0 2 M.L.B. marked the first time in several years that the Court ad-
dressed that problem. While it is a significant decision in that respect, it deals
only with one corner of the issue, leaving much for the future in terms of trying
to ensure that our courts are open to all and not just those with plenty of money.
92. Id. at 25-26.
93. Id. at 31.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 32.
96. Id. at 32-35.
97. Id. at 35.
98. Id. at 35-36.
99. Id. at 37-39.
100. Id. at 40-44.
101. Id. at 49-53.
102. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,16 (1956).
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